We investigate the defining power of stratified and hierarchical logic programs. As an example for the treatment of negative information in the context of these structured programs we also introduce a stratified and hierarchical closed-world assumption. Our analysis tries to relate the defining power of stratified and hierarchical programs (with and without an appropriate closed-world assumption) very precisely to notions and hierarchies in classical definability theory.
Stratified and hierarchical logic programs are two well-known and typical candidates of what one may more generally denote as structured programs. In both cases we have to deal with normal logic programs which satisfy certain syntactic conditions with respect to the occurrence of negative literals. Recently they have gained a lot of importance in connection with the search for nice declarative semantics for logic programs and the treatment of negative information in logic programming (e.g., Lloyd [10] ).
Stratified programs were introduced into logic programming by Apt, Blair, and Walker [2] and van Gelder [17] not long ago. In mathematical logic, however, theories of this kind have been studied for more than 20 years under the general theme of iterated inductive definability. Indeed, stratified programs can be understood as systems for (finitely) iterated inductive definitions where the definition clauses are of very low logical complexity. The notion of hierarchical program (e.g., Clark [6] , Shepherdson [15] ), on the other hand, is motivated by database theory and tries to reflect the idea of iterated explicit definability by simple principles.
From a conceptual point of view we are interested in the relationship between logic programming, inductive definability and equational definability. By making use of these connections we obtain a uniform and perspicuous approach to a series of interesting questions in this area.
The plan of this paper is as follows: Section 1 introduces some basic notions. Sections 2 and 3 present the relevant concepts from classical definability theory and are concerned with various forms of definability over Herbrand universes of first-order languages. In Section 4 we characterize the defining power of stratified programs. Among other things we prove that the arithmetically definable subsets of the nonnegative integers comprise the defining power of suitable stratified programs with the stratified closed-world assumption. Section 5 is then devoted to the study of hierarchical programs. It is shown that definite hierarchical programs pin down exactly the so-called term-definable relations. This is in sharp contrast to the defining power of arbitrary hierarchical logic programs which is shown to be equivalent to that of definite programs. Finally the hierarchical programs with the hierarchical closed-world assumption represent a class of intermediate strength. We will see that they exactly define the equationally definable relations.
Basic notions
First we have to introduce some basic terminology and definitions. We will try to follow the standard terminology of logic programming as far as possible and use Lloyd [10] as standard reference for unexplained notions and results.
We start out from countable first-order languages L with equality which satisfy the following conditions with respect to their function and relation symbols:
(1) L contains a finite number of function symbols; (2) L contains at least one 0-ary function symbol; (3) L contains countably many relation symbols P, Q, R, P 1 , Q 1 , R 1 , . . . of every finite arity.
First-order languages of this kind are called finite languages by Shepherdson [16] . In the context of logic programming the restriction to finitely many function symbols seems justified since every logic program only involves a finite number of function symbols. Observe, however, that logic programming is very sensitive with respect to the function symbols of the underlying language. In general the meaning m(T, L) of a logic program T with respect to the language L is different from m(T, L f ) if L f is the extension of L by a new function symbol f . On the other hand extensions of languages by additional relation symbols are completely unproblematic, and we have m(T, L) = m(T, L R ) for all extensions L R of L by a new relation symbol R. Therefore, we are free to assume that the underlying language contains an arbitrary number of relation symbols.
The terms s, t, s 1 , t 1 , . . . and formulas ϕ, ψ, χ, θ, ϕ 1 , ψ 1 , χ 1 , θ 1 , . . . of L are defined as usual; terms and formulas without free variables are called ground, 0-ary function symbols are called constants. Hence condition (2) guarantees the existence of a ground L term. The literals F, G, F 1 , G 1 , . . . of L are the atomic formulas and negated atomic formulas of L. Relation symbols different from the equality symbol are denoted as proper relation symbols; proper literals (proper atomic formulas) are literals (atomic formulas) which do not contain the equality symbol.
As usual, the Herbrand universe U L denotes the collection of all ground terms of L and the Herbrand base B L the collection of all ground atomic formulas of L. An L theory is a (possibly infinite) collection of L formulas. By T ϕ, we express that the formula ϕ can be deduced from the theory T by the usual axioms and rules of predicate logic with equality. Finally, a normal clause in L is an L formula ϕ of the form
with n ≥ 0, where G is a proper atomic formula and F 1 , . . . , F n are proper literals; ϕ is called definite if also the F 1 , . . . , F n are atomic. A normal program in L is a finite set of normal clauses in L, and a definite program in L is a finite collection of definite clauses in L.
The vector notation V is used as shorthand for a finite string V 1 , . . . , V n whose length will be specified by the context. We write ϕ[ R, x] to indicate that all proper relation symbols of the formula ϕ come from the list R and all free variables of ϕ from the list x; analogously, t[ x] stands for a term with no variables different from x. The formula ϕ( R, x) and the term t( x) may contain other relation symbols and free variables besides R and x. In addition, if A = A 1 , . . . , A n , then the notation A ⊂ U L is supposed to express that A 1 , . . . , A n are (arbitrary) relations on U L ; it does not imply, however, that
, we mean that ϕ is valid in the Herbrand structure with universe U L , provided that the relation symbols R are interpreted by the relations A and the free variables x by the elements a.
If C is a collection of L formulas, K a collection of relations on U L and B ⊂ U n L , then B is called C definable in L with parameters from K if there exists a formula ϕ[ R, x] in C and a sequence A of elements of K of appropriate arities such that
for all a ∈ U L . The class of all relations which are C definable in L with parameters
An n-ary relation A on U L is called definable by the L theory T if there exists an n-ary relation symbol R of L so that we have
Later we will also make some remarks about definability over the non-negative integers II N. To fit this concept into our present framework, we fix a finite first-order language L N with exactly one constant 0 and one unary function symbol S u . This function symbol represents a successor function, and the Herbrand universe U L N of L N , which we simply denote as U N , may be regarded as an isomorphic copy of II N, where the L N term S n u (0) corresponds to the natural number n,
Term and equationally definable relations
In this and the next section we introduce the tools from definability theory which will be used later in order to characterize the defining power of stratified and hierarchical programs with and without suitable forms of the closed-world assumption. We focus on three definition principles: (1) term definability, i.e., explicit definability by means of terms of the language; (2) explicit definability by equational formulas; and (3) inductive definability by positive Σ formulas. Proof. It is sufficient to show that the intersection of two locally term-definable sets is term-definable. Hence let
be two locally term-definable subsets of U n L . We may assume that the variables of s 1 , . . . , s n do not occur in t 1 , . . . , t n . If A ∩ B = ∅, then A ∩ B is term-definable; otherwise, there exists a most general unifier σ of s 1 , . . . , s n and t 1 , . . . , t n , and (1) The unary relations on U N which are term-definable in L N are exactly the A ⊂ U N so that A or ∼ A is finite.
(2) The set B := { a, a : a ∈ U N } is term-definable, but ∼ B is not termdefinable.
Term-definable relations will be important for describing the defining power of definite logic programs and are closely related to the parameter-free Σ + 1 relations introduced below (cf. Lemma 2.7). Now we turn to a more general notion and call an L formula an equational formula of L if it does not contain proper relation symbols. It follows from the previous definitions that every relation A on U L which is termdefinable in L is also equationally definable in L. The converse is not correct, as one can easily see by the following example: the relation { a, b ∈ U 2 N : a = b} is equationally definable but not term-definable.
Shepherdson's article [16] is devoted to the equality theory in the context of logic programming. Besides many other results it proves the following reduction property, which will help us later in comparing the strength of hierarchical programs with and without the hierarchical closed-world assumption. 
Here, an L formula is called strictly simple if it is of the form
where x = x 1 , . . . , x m and y = y 1 , . . . , y l and
• {σ(j) : j ∈ J} ⊂ {1, . . . , m} \ I and {τ (k) : k ∈ K} ⊂ {1, . . . , l};
• each x i for i ∈ I does not occur anywhere in the formula except on the lefthand side of
• each y j of y occurs in one of the terms r i [ x, y] for some i ∈ I.
Applied to the special case L = L N , this lemma has the consequence that a subset A ⊂ U N is equationally definable if and only if A or ∼ A is finite. Hence term definability in L N is equivalent to equational definability in L N as far as unary relations are concerned. However, as we have seen above, this equivalence cannot be extended to, for example, binary relations.
The class Σ + of positive existential L formulas is inductively defined as follows:
(1) If s and t are terms, then (s = t) belongs to Σ + .
(2) If R is an n-ary relation symbol of L and and t 1 , . . . , t n are terms, then the formula R(t 1 , . . . , t n ) belongs to Σ + .
(3) If ϕ and ψ belong to Σ + , then so do (ϕ ∨ ψ) and (ϕ ∧ ψ).
where ψ does not contain quantifiers. The class rΣ 
Σ
+ formulas have very simple normal forms with respect to the equality symbol and the other relation symbols which they contain. These normal forms also will provide a convenient tool for reducing Σ + inductively definable sets to suitable logic programs.
where the variables x 1 , . . . , x m and y are pairwise different and the F i [ y] are positive literals but no equations.
Proof. First we replace ϕ[ R, x] by a logically equivalent formula
where every
will now be transformed into a molecular formula, so that every transformation step is valid in U L . To achieve this, we put
by a version of the unification algorithm into the solved form
In this expression I is a subset of {1, . . . , g}, J a subset of {1, . . . , h} and the variables x i for i ∈ I and y j for j ∈ J do not occur in any of the terms on the right-hand side of the equations. Now we define
with F k [ x, y] denoting the atomic formula which results from F k [ x, y] by replacing x i by t i [ x, y] for i ∈ I and y j by t * j [ x, y] for j ∈ J. Observe that the variables x i for i ∈ I and y j for j ∈ J do not occur in
has been defined to be the class of all relations on U L that are Σ 
The proofs of these assertions are immediate from the definition of Σ 
Proof. It is obvious that every relation
In view of the previous lemma, one can therefore conclude that Σ
The following lemma will be used in Section 4. Its proof is straightforward by induction on the complexity of the Σ + formula involved.
Inductively definable relations
In order to characterize the defining power of stratified logic programs, we will make use of some concepts from the theory of inductive definitions as it is developed for example in the textbooks by Barwise [5] , Hinman [8] and Moschovakis [13] . Hence,
Then we define by recursion on the ordinals the following subsets of U m L :
Inductive definitions are studied at full length in the literature. In our special case we can conclude, for example, that (with the assumptions mentioned above)
(1) there exists an ordinal α ≤ ω so that
In the following, we will be interested in relations on U L which can be defined inductively over the Herbrand universe U L . and is closed under sections.
Moschovakis [13] contains a series of results concerning the closure properties of classes of inductively defined sets, for example, the simultaneous induction lemma, the combination lemma and the transitivity theorem. Applied to our context, we have the following basic properties of the classes
Remark 3.1. Let K be a collection of relations on U L .
(
(3) In general, the classes Σ + -IND(K, L) will not be closed under complements.
Motivated by this observation, we now introduce the hierarchy EI n (L) : n < ω of iterated existential inductive relations on U L . If K is a class of relations on U L , then we write K for the collection of their complements, i.e.,
Definition 3.2. By induction on the natural numbers n, we define the classes EI n (L) of relations on U L :
For notational simplicity, we will write EI n (N ) instead of EI n (L N ). The following observation is obvious.
Lemma 3.1.
In view of the reduction property of equational formulas we know that all equationally definable (in L) relations are contained in EI 0 (L) ∩ EI 0 (L). In general, however, there will be elements of EI 0 (L) which are not equationally definable in L. A typical example is the subset {s 2n u (0) : n ∈ II N} of U N which is inductively but not equationally definable.
The next theorem summarizes some basic properties of inductive definability over the natural numbers II N in terms of the classes EI n (N ). For the proof of this theorem we refer to the respective section in Hinman [8] .
Theorem 3.1. We have the following for all natural numbers n:
(1) EI 0 (N ) is the class of the recursively enumerable subsets of the natural numbers II N, i.e., the class of the Σ 1 subsets of II N.
(2) If K is a collection of relations on U N which contains EI 0 (N ) and is closed under complements, then we have:
is the class of the Σ n+2 subsets of the natural numbers II N.
Next, we turn to the relationship between definability over U L and U N . Similar observations have been made by various authors, such as Andreka and Nemeti [1] and Apt [3] . However, the approach presented here is more closely tied to the notion of inductive definability.
In a first step, we reduce fixed points of Σ + formulas to those of rΣ 
Until the end of this section, we assume that L is a language with finitely many function symbols and that at least one of this function symbols has an arity greater than 0. Then, there exists a mapping β from U L to U N ,
which is one to one and onto. If A is a subset of U n L , then we define β(A) := { β(a 1 ), . . . , β(a n ) : a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ A} and write β( b) and β( B) instead of β(b 1 ), . . . , β(b m ) and β(B 1 ), . . . , β(B n ) for all
An obvious induction on the length of the rΣ
for all a ∈ U L and A ⊂ U L . Using this observation, it is easy to show that we have for all ordinals α, a ∈ U L , A ⊂ U L and all rΣ
where the sets I α ϕ ( A) are defined over U L and the sets I α ϕ (β( A)) over U N . As a consequence, we obtain the following isomorphism between the sets I ϕ ( A) defined over U L and the sets I ϕ (β( A)) defined over U N :
It is straightforward but tedious to show that we can choose the bijection β so that the following two conditions are satisfied:
This correspondence plays an important role in the proof of the following theorem. Theorem 3.2. Let L and β be described as above. Then we have for all natural numbers n:
(2) If B ∈ EI n (N ), then there exists an A ∈ EI n (L), so that B = β(A).
Proof. We prove both assertions simultaneously by complete induction on n. I. n = 0. It is sufficient for the first assertion to show that β(A) ∈ EI 0 (N ) for all Our previous considerations then imply that (f 1 )) , . . . , β(Gr(f m ))).
By (β.1) and Remark 3.1, we can conclude that β(A) ∈ EI 0 (N ).
For the proof of the second assertion we confine ourselves again to the case of fixed points. So assume that we have a Σ
Then, there exists an rΣ
Now we define
and obtain
In addition, A is an element of EI 0 (L) because of (β.2) and Remark 3.1.
II. n → n + 1. Using the same strategy, the assertions for n + 1 follow immediately from the induction hypothesis.
Using the same ideas, one can also prove that β(Σ
Proof. If U L is finite, then the assertion is trivial; otherwise, it follows from Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2.
Stratified programs
Now the ground is prepared for an easy characterization of the defining power of stratified programs with and without the stratified closed-world assumption SCWA. Related results have been obtained by Apt and Blair [4] who study the logical complexity of the supported models M T of stratified programs T .
Stratified programs can be considered as special theories for iterated inductive definitions where the definition clauses are of very restricted form. We briefly review some basic notions and refer for more details to Apt, Blair, and Walker [2] and Lloyd [10] . A level mapping for L is a function α from the set Rel L of the relation symbols of L to the natural numbers II N,
If R is an n-ary relation symbol of L and t = t 1 , . . . , t n a sequence of L terms, then α(R( t)) and α(¬R( t)) are defined to be the number α(R). (1) α is called stratified with respect to T if we have for all elements
of T and all 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
(2) T is called stratified if there exists a level mapping for L which is stratified with respect to T . 
is stratified but not definite.
On the other hand, it is obvious that every definite program is stratified. The defining power of stratified programs therefore comprises that of the definite programs and is limited by the following well-known property of general recursively enumerable theories.
Remark 4.1. Let ϕ be the Gödel number of the L formula ϕ. If T is an arbitrary L theory, then there exists a subset A of the natural numbers which is recursively enumerable in { ϕ : ϕ ∈ T } such that we have for all ψ ∈ B L :
In addition, for every relation symbol R of L, there exists a relation B R which is recursively enumerable in { ϕ : ϕ ∈ T } such that we have for all a ∈ U L :
In view of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, this remark implies that all T -definable relations on U L belong to EI 0 (L). Not surprisingly, we therefore obtain a first theorem which characterizes the defining power of stratified programs. (
Proof. The first assertion follows from the observation above. For the second, let A be an element of Σ + -IND(∅, L). For notational simplicity we assume that there exists
for all a ∈ U L . The extension of our argument to the general case is straightforward. The relation B is the least fixed point of a Σ + formula ϕ[Q, x, y] of L, i. e., B = I ϕ (−).
By Lemma 2.5, this formula has a normal form
where every ψ i [Q, z] is a conjunction of atoms of the form Q(. . .). Now, define T to be the definite program
By some basic results on definite programs, it follows that
A normal program T in L is stratified if and only if S T L = ∅. In this case, we define for all relation symbols R of L: According to Reiter [14] , the closed world CWA(T, L) of a normal program T in L is usually defined as
The closed-world assumption CWA is often considered as a problematic concept, especially since it often transforms (necessarily consistent) normal programs T into inconsistent theories CWA(T, L). In the context of stratified programs, the situation can be significantly improved by replacing the general closed-world assumption CWA by the stratified closed-world assumption SCWA. An equivalent notion is introduced in [7] and denoted as iterated closed-world assumption. We prefer the name stratified closed-world assumption in order to distinguish it from the hierarchical closed-world assumption (to be introduced later) which is also generated by iterating the CWA in a suitable way.
define for all n ≤ m + 1:
Example 4.2. Assume that we have the stratified program
formulated in the language L N . Then, the closed world of T ,
is inconsistent whereas the stratified closed world of T ,
is consistent. If we replace T by the logically equivalent stratified program
then the closed worlds of T and T are the same whereas the stratified closed world of T is the consistent theory
Hence, the stratified closed-world assumption SCWA is a more careful extension of the CWA -at the price of being sensitive to logical transformations of the basic theory. It is tailored for stratified programs in the sense that the theory SCWA(T, L) is consistent for every stratified program T . The proof of the following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 4.1. Let T be a stratified program in L and define
Then, ∆ L (T ) induces a Herbrand model of SCWA(T, L).
For every stratified program T of height m and all n ≤ m, we define the restriction T n of T as the set of all formulas of T which do not contain relation symbols R of level σ T L (R) > n. Then T and T n have the same proof-theoretic power with respect to relations of levels up to n, no matter whether we work with or without the SCWA. (1) T R( a) ⇐⇒ T n R( a),
Now assume that T 0 and T 1 are stratified programs in L which have no relation symbols in common.
(4) If Q is a relation symbol which occurs in T 0 then we have for all a ∈ U L
SCWA(T
Proof. The first and second assertion can be checked easily. The third follows from Lemma 4.1. The fourth is proved by induction on the level σ The following theorem answers the question about the structure of the relations on U L which can be defined by stratified programs plus the stratified closed-world assumption. It also makes clear that the provability relation induced by the SCWA can be of arbitrary arithmetical complexity. (
Proof.
(1) Let T be a stratified program of height m. Then, an easy induction on n ≤ m shows:
n+1 relation A on the natural numbers so that we have for all a ∈ U L : (2) The second assertion is proved by induction on m. Hence, let A be an element of EI m (L). To keep the notation as simple as possible, we restrict ourselves to the discussion of the following special case (the extension of our arguments to full generality is then obvious):
(ii) B is the least fixed point generated by the Σ + formula ϕ[P, Q, R, x, y] and the unary C ∈ EI m−1 (L) and D ∈ EI m−1 (L), i.e.,
We apply the induction hypothesis to C and E :=∼ D and conclude that there are stratified programs T C and T E of height m − 1 and relation symbols R C and R E satisfying
for all a ∈ U L . Without loss of generality, we can assume that T C and T E have no relation symbols in common. From (2), we obtain with the stratified closed-world assumption that
for all a ∈ U L . By Lemma 2.5, ϕ[P, Q, R, x, y] has a normal form
where each ψ i [P, Q, R, z] is a conjunction of atomic formulas P (. . .), Q(. . .) and R(. . .). Now we choose new relation symbols R D , R B and R A and define
T is a stratified program of height σ L (T ) ≤ m. Exploiting the locality of stratified programs and some simple properties of inductive definitions, we obtain for all a, b ∈ U L :
The direction "=⇒" of (5) is based on the fact that B = I ϕ (C, D) is a fixed point of ϕ[P, Q, R, x, y] and therefore,
for all a ∈ U L . In order to establish the converse direction of (5), we recall that
and prove by induction on k:
If a,
By (4), the induction hypothesis and Lemma 2.8, we obtain
and hence, by definition of T ,
This completes the proof of (7). This equivalence, the definition of T and the definition of A finally yield
for all a ∈ U L . Hence, we have shown that the relation A is an element of Def L (SCWA(T, L)) for some stratified program of height m.
Remark 4.2. This theorem can also be obtained by combining results of Apt and
Blair [4] and Gelfond, Przymusinska and Przymusinski [7] . However, our approach is conceptually different and develops the definability theory of stratified programs from the more general point of view of inductive definability. We think that this provides a more perspicuous approach to stratified programs and reveals the close connections between stratified programs and inductive definitions.
Hierarchical programs
An alternative and important class of structured programs is provided by the class of the so-called hierarchical programs. As the stratified programs, they are defined by an easy-to-check syntactic condition which, however, is more restrictive than the requirements imposed on stratified programs.
Definition 5.1. Let T be a normal program in L and α a level mapping for L.
(1) α is called hierarchical with respect to T if we have for all elements
(2) T is called hierarchical if there exists a level mapping for L which is hierarchical with respect to T . It is obvious that every hierarchical program is stratified. The following program T , on the other hand, is definite (and therefore stratified) but not hierarchical:
The situation corresponds to that of stratified programs: if T is a hierarchical program in L, then η T L is a hierarchical level mapping for T , called the minimal hierarchical level mapping of T ; the number η L (T ) is denoted as the hierarchical height of T . One has to observe, however, that, although every hierarchical program is stratified, the stratified height σ L (T ) of a hierarchical program T may be different from its hierarchical height η L (T ).
Hierarchical programs which are also definite provide an interesting subclass of the hierarchical programs and will be studied separately. Then, we turn to hierarchical programs with negation and finally to the hierarchical closed-world assumption. (
is a term-definable relation in L.
(2) For every relation A on U L which is term-definable in L, there exists a definite hierarchical program T in L of height 0 so that A ∈ Def L (T ).
(1) Let T be a definite hierarchical program. The idea is to prove by induction on η L T (R) that, for every relation symbol R, the set
is term-definable. In the induction step, one has to make use of some well-known results on definite logic programs and the observation that A R is Σ + 1 in some relations which are term-definable by induction hypothesis. From Lemma 2.6 and Lemma 2.7 it follows that A R is term-definable.
(2) Let A be a subset of U n L which is term-definable in L and of the form
Then, A is definable by the program
which consists of atomic L formulas only. T is a definite hierarchical program in L of height 0.
The defining power of hierarchical programs with negation is particularly interesting. At first sight, it seems that hierarchical programs do not allow recursive definitions, since the same relation symbol must not occur on the left-and right-hand side of an implication. However, the following lemma shows that already, hierarchical programs of height 1 possess the same defining power as definite programs. The reason for this surprising result is the use of classical logic. If we work with a special form of resolution, the defining power of hierarchical programs with negation may collapse dramatically. T F ⇐⇒ T *
F.
Proof. Let R 1 , . . . , R m be the enumeration of the relation symbols occurring in T . Then, we choose new relation symbols Q 1 , . . . , Q m of corresponding arities and sufficiently many new variables y 1 , . . . , y n to carry through the following construction. If
is the element ψ of T , then we write ϕ for the formula which results from ϕ by replacing each relation symbol R j by Q j for j = 1, . . . , m and define ψ * to be the formula ϕ ∧ ¬Q i (t 1 , . . . , t k ).
Finally we set
T * is a hierarchical program in L of height 1, and it is easily shown that T and T Example 5.1. Let L be the language with the constant a and the unary function symbol f . Then, the definite program
proves the same ground atoms as the hierarchical program T * of height 1 given by the clauses:
It is a consequence of this lemma that the class of hierarchical programs has the defining power of the class of definite program. Since, according to Theorem 4.1, the defining power of stratified programs is limited to EI 0 , we obtain the following result. (
Remark 5.1. It seems that any procedural approach to this form of defining power must be based on general resolution, which is never done in any Prolog-like environment.
Now, we adjust the definition of stratified closed-world assumption to the case of hierarchical programs in order to obtain the corresponding notion of hierarchical closed-world assumption. If follows the same idea as above but with the level function σ
In many aspects the hierarchical closed-world assumption is similar to the stratified closed-world assumption:
(1) There are hierarchical theories T such that CWA(T, L) is inconsistent;
(2) HCWA(T, L) is always consistent; (3) the HCWA reflects a more careful closing process than the CWA and is sensitive to logical transformations of the underlying theory; (4) Theorem 4.2 also holds for hierarchical programs.
But there is also one big difference. Whereas the defining power of stratified programs is enormously increased by adding the stratified closed-world assumption, this is not the case for the hierarchical closed-world assumption. Moreover, the following theorem shows that the defining power of hierarchical programs collapses if we allow closure under the HCWA. In order to prove it we need the following fixed point characterization of the hierarchical closed-world assumption. Proof. Define ∆ to be the collection of all atomic formulas Gσ ∈ B L so that the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) σ is a ground substitution;
Our lemma is established if we can show that ∆ is the collection of elements of B L which are provable in HCWA(T, L), i.e.,
The implication from left to right is obvious, the implication from right to left is proved by induction on η T L (F ). Toward this end, assume η T L (F ) = n and HCWA(T, L) F . By the locality principle for hierarchical programs, it follows that HCWA n (T n, L) F . Exploiting the induction hypothesis, it is then an easy exercise to show that
induces a Herbrand model of HCWA n (T n, L). This implies F ∈ ∆ n ⊂ ∆. (
is equationally definable in L.
(2) For every relation A on U L which is equationally definable in L, there exists a hierarchical program T in L of height 1 so that A ∈ Def L (HCWA(T, L)).
for all a ∈ U L . If Q does not occur in T , then this assertion is trivially satisfied. Hence, let
be the definition of Q in T . Then, the hierarchical height of the relation symbols R = R 1 , . . . , R k is smaller then η T L (Q), and the induction hypothesis gives us equational formulas
Because of the presence of the hierarchical closed-world assumption, it is immediate that
Since each ψ i [ R, x] is a conjunction of literals of the form R j (. . .) and ¬R j (. . .), we conclude that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m and a ∈ U L ,
where
By Lemma 5.2, we have for all a ∈ U L :
(2) Let A be defined by the equational formula ϕ [ x] , where x = x 1 , . . . , x n . According to Lemma 2.3, there exist strictly simple equality formulas
for all a ∈ U L . Now, choose a binary relation symbol EQ (for equality) and an n-ary relation symbol R. To a strictly simple equality formula θ[ x] of the form Obviously T is a hierarchical program of height 1. Using Lemma 5.2, it follows that
for all a ∈ U L .
Remark 5.2.
(1) Kunen [9] states a similar result for infinite languages and the negations as failure rule instead of the HCWA. From work of Mal'cev [12] and Maher [11] , one obtains the following decidability result for the validity of equational sentences over the corresponding Herbrand structure. It must not be confused with the (undecidable) notion of logical provability of an equational sentence.
Remark 5.3. Let ϕ be an equational formula of L which contains no free variables.
Then, it is decidable whether U L |= ϕ or not.
This remark is interesting in our context, since it shows that the collection of equationally definable subsets of U L is comparatively small. In particular, every equationally definable relation on U L is recursive. A similar observation is also made in Apt and Blair [4] , but there, it is a consequence of a different approach.
To end this paper, we consider the class of weakly hierarchical programs which is located -according to its syntactic definition -between the classes of hierarchical and stratified programs. With respect to its defining power, however, it corresponds to the stratified programs. (1) α is called weakly hierarchical with respect to T if we have for all elements F 1 ∧ . . . ∧ F n → G of T and all 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
• α(F i ) ≤ α(G),
• α(F i ) < α(G) provided that F i is a negative literal or α(G) = 0.
(2) T is called weakly hierarchical if there exists a level mapping for L which is weakly hierarchical with respect to T . It is obvious that every hierarchical program is weakly hierarchical and every weakly hierarchical program is stratified. There are also weakly hierarchical programs which are not hierarchical, and stratified programs which are not weakly hierarchical, so that we have to deal with proper inclusions. The characterization of weakly hierarchical programs follows from Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 5.2. Open Questions.
(1) The first question refers to the choice of logic. As remarked above, many of our results -and especially Lemma 5.1 -are correct only since we worked with classical logic. Therefore, it could be interesting to find characterizations of the defining power of stratified and hierarchical programs in the presence of non-classical logics.
(2) Also the second question refers to Lemma 5.1. Our translation of definite programs into hierarchical programs does in general not provide allowed programs. Therefore, what is the defining power of allowed hierarchical programs?
